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1 
THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ON THE LABOUR MARKET 
JA. Vijlbrief* 
Section 1: Introduction 
j Sometimes, the unemployment insurance system is accused of stimulating people to enjoy prolonged 
; jperiods of leisure. Unemployment benefits and employees' contributions are presumed to be a 
idisincentive to supply labour and to be a major cause of voluntary unemployment. Employers' 
1
 'unemployment insurance contributions raise the costs of labour and reduce labour demand. The goal 
jof this paper is threefold. First we will investigate the theoretical relation between unemployment 
- insurance and labour supply and demand. Secondly we are interested in the magnitude of the effect of 
| unemployment insurance (and especialiy benefits) on unemployment. Thirdly we are looking for clues 
on the modelling of unemployment insurance in macro-economie simulation models. These simulation 
models will be the topic of further research on the effects of unemployment insurance on the labour 
market. 
J In section 2 of this paper we will consider two models of the labour market as framework to study 
(the effects of unemployment insurance. The first one is the static neo-classical model of the labour 
l market, dealt with in section 2.2. Unemployment benefits and unemployment insurance contributions 
:
 affect the 'price of leisure' (the difference between net wages and net benefits) and consequently the 
: supply of labour. With the help of this model we are able to come to a number of hypotheses about 
| the effects of unemployment insurance on labour supply and demand. Moreover, from utility 
i maximization we derive a labour supply function including unemployment benefits and contribulions. 
The second model of the labour market (section 2.3) is a more dynamic model in which unemploy-
ment insurance influences the flow into and out of unemployment. We use the job search model in 
order to analyze the effects of the level of benefits on the flow from unemployment to employment. 
This model enables us to give a number of predictions regarding the relation between the unemploy-
ment insurance system and the duration of unemployment. For the job search model as well as for the 
static neo-classical model, the actual shape of the unemployment insurance system -qualification 
requirements, maximum benefit periods etcetera- appears to be important for the effects of the system 
on labour supply and demand. 
f In section 3 of this paper we look at empirical results concerning the effects of unemployment 
ijnsurance on the level or duration of unemployment. The estimates of the elasticity of unemployment 
jo the level of benefits or the replacement ratio in aggregate time-series studies (reviewed in 3.2), 
appear to vary a lot. Empirical studies using data on individual unemployment durations and relating 
ithis to the benefit entitlement are considered in section 3.3. These studies which are based on the job 
search model come to more convergent results on the elasticity of unemployment duration to the level 
|of unemployment benefits. 
! In section 4 we summarize this paper and draw some conclusions about the existence and the size 
of the effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment and about the implications for the 
modelling of unemployment insurance. 
Research Fellow of Economics, member of the Applied Labour Economics Research Team 
(ALERT). The author wishes to thank FA.G. den Butter and B. Compaijen for useful comments. 
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Section 2: Theorv 
12.1 Introduction 
! • 
.1 In this section we consider how unemployment benefits and unemployment insurance contributions 
, influence the demand for and supply of labour. We use two methods to study the relation between 
' unemployment insurance and labour market behaviour. 
f In section 2.2 unemployment insurance is analyzed within the framework of the static neo-classical 
£ model of the labour market j The introduction of unemployment benefits reduces 'the price of leisure' 
,f"(ïx."'the"Wagë ïate-mitftfs~'the benefit) in this Standard model. Both the substitution- and income-effect 
i will lead to a fall in the supply of labour. With regard to unemployment insurance contributions to be 
i paid by employees the results are less clear-cut: higher contributions by employees reduce labour 
supply when we consider the substitution effect while the income effect raises labour supply, provided 
\ that leisure is a normal good. Higher contributions to be paid by employers will generally lead to 
f rising labour costs and falling labour demand. 
In section 2.3 we take a more dynamic look at the labour market. Unemployment insurance may 
act as explanatory variable for labour market transitions such as: 
-the flow from employment into unemployment through layoffs and quits; 
-the flow from unemployment into employment1. 
We examine the influence of unemployment insurance on the transitions from employment into 
unemployment in section 23.1. Section 2.3.2 studies the relation between unemployment benefits and 
the flow from unemployment into employment, within the framework of 'search theory'. 
In search models the assumption of a homogeneous supply of and demand for labour is dropped 
and information about jobs is not fully and freely available. Spending time being unemployed and 
acquiring information about the 'right job' can be regarded as optimising behaviour by the worker. 
This search time lengthens unemployment duration and causes (voluntary) unemployment. As 
unemployment benefits reduce the costs of job search (in terms of lost income), higher benefits will 
lead to a longer duration of unemployment. In section 2.3.2 however, we will see that this rather 
simplistic view of the relation between an unemployment insurance system and unemployment duration 
can be amended in such a way that the above conclusion no longer always holds. 
\ 
2.2 The Standard neo-classical model 
This section uses the Standard neo-classical model of the labour market as framework for analysis. 
f'The labour supply function is derived from utility maximization by the worker while profit maximiza-
1 j tion by the employer gives the labour demand relation, representing the equality of real wages and the 
\ lmarginal productivity of labour. We assume the suppliers of labour maximise the following constant-
! elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function: 
i 
v_/ 
Although the flow from unemployment to non-participation and vice versa can also be affected 
by unemployment insurance, this is negleCted here. We will return to this point in the next section. 
3 
(n.1) U = (av0 + By0)1/0 
in which: U = utility 
a,/3= parameter 
c = coëfficiënt of substitution, such that -1/1-c = <f>, the elasticity of substitution 
v = time not spent working 
y = income available for consumption (savings are zero) 
In the absence of an unemployment insurance system, the budget constraints look as follows: 
(11.2) y = w.1 
(11.3) v = T - 1 
in which: w = real wage rate 
1 = labour supply 
T = available time 
Maximization of (II.l) under (11.2) and (II.3) yields equation (II.4), the labour supply function : 
(11.4) 1 = T - w.T.[w + ((B/o).w)1/1"°]*1 
Now we take another look at this optimization problem, considering the existence of an unemploy-
ment insurance system. This system pays a flat-rate benefit to members of the labour force for each 
unit of time they do not spend working. For now, we will abstract from the financing of these 
benefits. The optimization problem takes the following form: 
(II.l) U = (avc + Byc)1/° 
(11.5) y = w.1 + b.v 
(113) v = T - 1 
in which: b = real unemployment benefit per unit of time not worked 
The solution of this problem is again given by the labour supply function, equation (II.6): 
(11.6) 1 = T - w.T.[ (w - b) + ((B/a).(w - b))1 / 1 _ c ]"1 
The disincentive effect of the unemployment benefit on labour supply is reflected by the negative 
derivative of labour supply to the level of benefits b in equation (II.6) (see appendix A at the end of 
this paper ). 
2
 Strictly speaking, not equation (1) is maximised, but a transformation of this function: 
U = (avc + Byc). This is allowed, because of the uniqueness of utility-index functions in a monotonie 
transformation. 
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Figure 1 : The optimum supply of labour 
These same conclusions can be reached by studying this maximization problem graphically. In figure 
1 we show the optimization problem, in the absence of unemployment benefits. The wage rate is 
represented by the slope of the budget constraint Ty (T is available time), as can be seen in equation 
(II.7): 
(11.7) y = w.T - w.v 
The optimum can be found in point EQ, at the tangency of Ty with an indifference curve IQ. In this 
optimum the worker chooses vQ units of leisure and (T - vQ) units of working time. 
When we introducé the flat-rate benefit system and continue to abstract from the financing of these 
benefits, the income-leisure frontier is no longer Ty, but TAy. The slope of Ay is equal to the diffe-
rence between the wage rate and the flat-rate benefit, as can be seen in the equation for the budget 
constraint: 
(11.8) y = w.T - (w - b).v 
for v < T 
A new optimum can be found in point E r Both the substitution- and the income-effect (when leisure 
is a normal good) of this change in the 'price of leisure' lead to an increase in hours of leisure from 
vQ to v1 and thus to a reduction of labour supply from (T - VQ) to (T - v.,). 
The unemployment benefit system we introduced in this section is not a very realistic example of 
the provision of unemployment insurance. In many countries a certain 'qualification period' (a 
minimum working period) is needed to become eligible for unemployment benefits, for example Tv2 in 
figure 2. Moreover it is possible that the provision of benefits is constrained to a given period, say 
Ov3 units of time. So, when a labourer works for Tv2 units of time he becomes eligible for Ov3 units 
of time of unemployment benefits. His total income at v2 would be Oy' (from employment) plus y'y" 
(from unemployment, i.e. the benefit level times the maximum period of unemployment Ov3). For 
each extra unit of time devoted to labour beyond v2 total income rises with the wage rate (so this 
5 
part of the new budget constraint is parallel to the old one, Ty, in the absence of unemployment 
insurance). However, beyond v3 the extra income of working an extra unit of time is equal to the 
wage rate minus the level of benefit: the worker looses unemployment benefits for each unit of time 
he works. The budget constraint that belongs to this particular benefit system is shown in figure 2 as 
TMNPjr. In such a case the qualification period, the benefit period, the wage rate and the level of 
unemployment benefits all effect the income-leisure frontier and the optimum supply of labour. 
p 
N 
M 
0 
v3 ¥2 f leisure 
Figure 2 : The income-leisure trade off belonging to a system with a qualification period 
and a maximum benefit period 
A different unemployment benefit system, used in some countries, is a 'ratio-system': the unemploy-
ment benefit is a constant portion (the 'replacement ratio') of the pre-unemployment wage rate of the 
recipiënt. The slope of the budget constraint faced by the worker, (w - b) (the difference between 
wage rate and benefits; see figure 1) can be rewritten to w.(l - b/w), the product of the wage rate 
and one minus the 'replacement ratio'. When we rewrite the labour supply function (II.6) for this case, 
it becomes: 
(II.6') 1 = T - w.T.[ w.(l - b/w) + ((B/a).w.(l - b/w))1/1-0 r1 
Until now, we have not given any attention to the effects of the financing of unemployment benefits 
on the supply of labour. We assume that benefits are partially financed by a proportional tax on 
employees' labour income. In the case of a flat-rate benefit system, optimum labour supply is now 
found by maximizing: 
(II.1) U = (avc + 6yc)1/c 
3
 See Hilüer, 1985, p. 318. 
6 
subject to: 
(H.9) y = wn.l + b.v 
(11.10) wR = w.(l - t) 
(II.3) v = T - 1 
in which: wn = net real wage 
t = tax rate on employees' labour income 
The labour supply function becomes: 
(H.11) 1 = T - wn.T.[ (wn - b) + <(B/a).(wn - b ) ) 1 ^ ]"1 
i icome 
y 
y' 
Figure 3 : The effect of employees' labour taxes on labour supply 
In figure 3 we study this maximization problem graphically. Since we assume a simple flat-rate benefit 
system, this figure closely resembles figure 1. However, the slope of the budget constraint falls after 
the introduction of the labour tax to the difference between the net wage rate and the flat-rate 
benefit: 
(11.12) y = wn.T - (wn - b).v 
for v < T 
The fall in net wages has a theoretically ambiguous effect on labour supply: the substitution effect will 
reduce labour supply while the income effect will lead to higher supply (when leisure is a normal 
7 
good). It is an empirical question which one of the two effects is the stronger . In this section we will 
assume that the substitution effect of a change in the net wage rate is larger than the income effect: 
in this case labour supply falls when unemployment insurance contributions are introduced (see figure 
3)5. 
Summarizing, in the Standard neo-classical framework the effects of unemployment insurance on 
labour supply are: 
-higher unemployment benefits reduce labour supply; 
-in real-world benefit systems the qualification period and the maximum benefit period will also 
influence optimum labour supply; 
-the effect of higher unemployment insurance contributions (paid by employees) on labour supply 
depends on the strength of the substitution- and income effect of the fall in net wages. 
The financing of benefits in an unemployment insurance system can also affect labour demand. In 
the Netherlands, as well as in many other countries, a part of the unemployment insurance contribu-
tions is paid by employers: an employer has to pay unemployment insurance premiums for each 
worker he employs. Ceteris paribus, these contributions raise wage costs and cause a fall in the 
demand for labour. The size of this fall in labour demand depends on the elasticity of labour demand 
to real wage costs. 
Figure 4 summarizes the results of this section until now. The labour supply curve L s 0 is a 
graphical representation of equation (II.4): the labour supply function in the absence of unemployment 
insurance. Apart from this so-called 'effective' labour supply, the figure shows registered labour supply 
(the labour force), Lf. This registered labour supply is assumed to be almost inelastic to changes in 
the real wage level. The labour demand curve Ld Q describes the marginal productivity relation. In an 
equilibrium framework the labour market clears at wQ. The difference between current employment LQ 
and the labour force Lf Q is called the natural unemployment . 
The introduction of flat-rate unemployment benefits will cause labour supply to fall, hence the 
effective labour supply curve shifts to the left. Since we assume that the substitution effect of a fall in 
net wages is larger than the income effect, the introduction of unemployment insurance contributions 
will also lead to a reduction of labour supply. The new labour supply curve gets the shape of Ls.,: 
when the wage rate approaches the flat-rate benefit, the elasticity of effective labour supply to wages 
approaches infinity7. L
 1 is the labour supply curve representing equation (11.11). 
4
 See for a review of empirical research on this subject Theeuwes, 1988, pp. 127-129. 
5
 It is also possible to finance the unemployment benefits by taxing wages and benefits at the 
same rate or by levying a lump-sum tax. In the latter case the substitution effect of the unemployment 
insurance contributions will be eliminated and only the income effect will be present (in figure 3 this 
would mean a parallel shift of the budget constraint after the introduction of unemployment insurance 
contributions). 
6
 This natural unemployment can be caused by mismatches of workers' skills and job require-
ments, by mismatches of workers and job locations, by workers engaged in job search or enjoying 
leisure etc. 
This result can be calculated from labour supply functions (6) and (11). 
8 
The decision to participate in the labour force can also be influenced by the level of unemployment 
benefits and contributions. Higher unemployment benefits can act as an incentive to join the labour 
force because the price of non-participation increases (non-participants are not entitled to benefits). 
According to Hamermesh this 'entitlement effect' (people joining the labour force to become entitled 
to benefits) is especially strong for (married) women8. The effect of higher contributions on labour 
force participation is not clean while generally participation will be reduced because of the fall in net 
wages, it is also possible that for certain groups of people the income effect will dominate. We assume 
that on balance registered labour supply will not shift after the introduction of unemployment 
insurance. 
Employers' contributions for unemployment insurance raise wage costs and (ceteris paribus) reduce 
labour demand. In figure 4 this means a shift of L^ to the left (at the same level of gross real wages, 
the employer will demand less labour). When we assume market clearing, the equilibrium level of 
gross real wages rises to v/v The new equilibrium employment level is L1 and natural unemployment 
increases to L^ Lf •)• This rise of unemployment is the result of a combination of falling employment 
and a small rise of the labour force. 
gross real wiges 
wi 
wO 
b 
LI L'0
 L(j0 Lf,t l a b o u r 
Figure 4: The effects of an unemployment insurance system in a clearing labour market 
We now drop the assumption of labour market clearing in figure 5 so as to analyze the effects of 
unemployment insurance in a disequilibrium framework. We adopt a fixed wage rate which is above 
market-clearing level. Before the introduction of unemployment insurance, total unemployment is 
LQLf Q: equilibrium (or natural) unemployment is the difference between the labour force and effective 
labour supply, disequilibrium unemployment is the difference between labour demand and effective 
supply. We now introducé unemployment insurance, having the same effects on the labour supply and 
demand curve as in figure 4. In this case only the shift of the labour demand curve causes total 
See Hamermesh, 1979. We return to this subject in sëction 3 of this paper. 
9 
unemployment to rise to I ^LJQ. Because of the above equiUbrium level of the fixed wage rate, 
employment is demand determined and the fall in effective labour supply does not influence total 
unemployment. 
However, when we neglect the fall of labour demand for a moment, the shift of the effective 
labour supply curve caused by the introduction of unemployment insurance, does affect the composi-
tion of unemployment: equiUbrium unemployment rises while disequüibrium unemployment (ceteris 
paribus) falls. An effect of the shifting composition of unemployment could be to reduce the 
downward pressure on real wages: when we assume that only disequüibrium unemployment puts a 
downward pressure on the wage rate, the introduction (or rise) of unemployment benefits can (ceteris 
paribus) reduce this pressure and the tendency of the labour market to clear. 
gross real wages 
* 
D 
Lf,0 labour 
Figure 5: The influence of an unemployment insurance system in a 
labour market with a fixed wage rate (w) 
The figures 4 and 5 show that the effects of unemployment insurance on the labour market depend 
on the assumption of market clearing. In the case of a flexible real wage, higher benefits and higher 
contributions wül raise (equiUbrium) unemployment. In the case we assume a fixed wage rate, only the 
level of employers' contributions affects total unemployment. The level of benefits and employees' 
contributions does influence the composition of this unemployment: the higher benefits and employees' 
contributions, the larger equiUbrium unemployment and the smaUer the downward pressure on real 
wages. 
Hence, when we want to analyze the effects of unemployment insurance in smaU macro-economie 
equiUbrium- and disequüibrium models for the Dutch labour market, we have to consider the fact that 
these effects are dependent on the labour market regime which is present. Moreover, we need 
information on the actual arrangements of the Dutch unemployment insurance system to model the 
effects accurately. 
10 
2.3 Unemployment insurance and flows on the labour market 
2.3.1 Unemployment insurance and the flow from employment to unemployment: quits and temporary 
layoffs 
The number of unemployed people can be viewed as the flow into unemployment times the 
(average) duration of an unemployment spell . In this section we study the influence of unemployment 
insurance on the flow from employment into unemployment. In the next section we consider the 
effects of unemployment benefits on the duration of an unemployment spell. 
The first channel through which unemployment insurance can influence the flow from employment 
to unemployment is the possible effect of unemployment insurance on voluntary quits. In most 
unemployment insurance systems however, job quitters are not (fully) entitled to unemployment 
benefits. Sometimes job quitters are denied (a part of the) benefits or they must face a substantial 
disqualification period. Hence, the influence of the level of unemployment benefits on voluntary quits 
can be expected to be small . Moreover, Nickell points out the limited relevance of the flow into 
unemployment for the total unemployment stock and the small part of quits which is in fact volunta-
ry11-
/
^~ The flow from employment to unemployment not only consists of job quitters but also of people 
who are laid off. Sometimes a worker who is laid off, is rehired by his original employer. In the 
United States these so-called 'temporary layoffs' are of major importance^To quote Feldstein : 
"Even in a year of relatively high unemployment like 1971 (when the unemployment rate was 5.9 
percent), manufacturing fïrms were rehiring about 85 percent of the workers that they had 
previously laid off." 
Feldstein noted the effect an unemployment insurance system can have on the magnitude of this 
temporary layoff phenomenon . In his model workers reckon with the possibility of being temporarily 
laid off and they are compensated for the chance of becoming unemployed in their total renumeration. 
The introduction of unemployment benefits will raise the expected compensation of employees who are 
subject to layoffs. When the costs of these unemployment benefits are not (fully) borne by the fïrm, 
fïrms have an incentive to lay off more workers than in the absence of an unemplpyment insurance 
system. Another way to look at this effect is thisü in the absence of an unemployment insurance 
system, fïrms would have to compensate their employees for spells of temporary unemployment. When 
there is a benefit system in which the unemployment insurance contributions of fïrms are not (per-
9
 This only holds when the number of unemployed is constant, hence when the flows into and 
out of unemployment are equal. 
1 0
 See Marston, 1980. In this empirical study a relation between the level of benefits and 
voluntary quits could not be found. 
11
 See Nickell, 1979b, pp. 34-35. 
12
 See Feldstein in a comment on a paper by Marston, 1975, p. 53. 
1 3
 See Feldstein, 1976. See also Topel & Welch, p. 357 and Brechling, 1981, p. 189. 
11 
fectly) tied to the amount of benefits drawn by its employees, the marginal cost of layoffs to firms is 
reduced. 
•o 
"/ This incentive effect for temporary layoffs, caused by the unemployment insurance system can be 
avoided by 'full experience rating" i.e. the firm has to pay the full cost of its layoffs.1 In the United 
States, employers are indeed required to pay insurance contributions on the basis of the unemploy-
ment experience of their employees, but these payments are limited to a maximum. When a company 
passes this maximum level of contributions, the marginal costs of an extra layoff become zero. Feld-
stein speaks about an 'unemployment insurance subsidy to layoffs' when the experience rating is 
imperfect . The formula for this layoff subsidy is: 
[ (1 - tb) - (1 - y . e ] . b 
(H.13) S = 
( ! - t w ) 
in which: S = layoff subsidy 
tb = tax on benefits 
t^ = tax on wages 
e = level of experience rating 
b = unemployment benefit 
In this formula the excess of net unemployment benefits (1 - tb).b over the net cost of these benefits 
for the employer (1 - ^ . e . b , is measured in terms of equivalent pretax earnings. Notice that in the 
case of full experience rating (e = 1), the layoff subsidy is stül positive when the tax rate on wages is 
larger than on benefits. When for example wages are taxed but benefits are not (which is the case in 
the United States), the unemployment insurance subsidy to layoffs remains, even in the case of full 
experience rating. This is caused by thj fact that for the employer the cost of the provision of 
unemployment benefits is lower than the wage premium he would have had to pay in the absence of 
an unemployment insurance system. 
The effect of an unemployment insurance subsidy to layoffs becomes especially prominent in times 
of a fall in the demand for goods and labour. The layoff subsidy induces firms to temporary layoffs 
instead of diminishing working hours. An unemployment benefit system without perfect experience 
rating also influences the structure of employment: in the absence of unemployment benefits, firms 
with unsteady employment (construction, agriculture etc.) would have to pay a wage premium to their 
employees for the increased chance of temporary layoff. When an unemployment insurance system 
exists, this premium can be lower. Without full experience rating, the industries with seasonal or 
cyclical fluctuations in employment are in fact subsidized and unstable employment gets a greater 
share in total employment. 
Hence, the flow from employment to unemployment can be affected by unemployment insurance. 
The influence of unemployment benefits on voluntary job quits will be small. On the contrary, the 
amount of temporary layoffs is likely to be affected by an unemployment insurance system without full 
experience rating, but we should keep in mind that temporary layoffs are an American phenomenon 
* and not of frequent occurrence in the Netherlands. However, it is quite possiblè that~the Dutcrr 
employment structure is influenced by the existence of an unemployment insurance subsidy. 
See Feldstein, 1976, p. 946. 
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2.3.2 The search model 
In the Standard neo-classical model of the labour market, both jobs and workers are homogeneous. 
There is one kind of job, suitable for everybody and one well-known wage rate. Of course this is not a 
realistic picture of the labour markety 'Search theory* is a labour market theory that allows for 
hefêrögëneity. When jobs™(and~ werkers ) differ from each other and information about jobs is costly, 
it can be efficiënt for a worker to 'search for the right job', while being (voluntarily) unemployed, 
Search theory, developed in the seventies is a useful framework to study the effects of unemploy-
ment insurance on (the supply side of) the labour market,/We fïrst study a basic job search model 
with the following assunïptiöns 7: 
-information about jobs and wages is incomplete; however, workers are assumed to know the 
distribution of wages in the labour market; 
-workers only search for jobs while being unemployed (there is no on-the-job search); 
-workers maximise their expected lifetime income; 
-a job offer is an independent drawing out of a known probability distribution of wages, f(w); 
-an unemployed worker gets exactly one job offer per period; 
-the (net) costs per period of search are : the direct costs (C) minus unemployment benefïts (b); 
-the searcher has an infinite time horizon; 
-the searcher has no time preference. 
Under these conditions, it can be shown that the searcher maximizes expected lifetime income by 
pursuing the following 'optimal stopping rule': choose a reservation wage w and accept any offer 
above it while rejecting offers below wr . This reservation wage is set to a level such that the 
expected return of continued search is equal to the expected cost of this search. 
In figure 6 we show the distribution of wage offers, faced by the searcher. Now the probabiüty of 
receiving a wage offer which is at least equal to the reservation wage, is: 
(ii.i4) p = ; w ; f ( w ) d w 
The expected duration of search can be written as: 
1 1 
(11.15) D* = = 
P Sw* f ( w ) d w 
In this section we will give attention to workers' search for a job because this search is 
influenced by unemployment insurance. The search process by firms to get the right employee for a 
certain vacancy is not the matter of interest here. 
16
 For a review of the various search models, see Lippman & McCall, 1976. 
17
 This representation of the job search model is derived from Fallon & Verry, 1988, pp. 196-
205. 
See for the formal derivation of this optimal stopping rule, Lippman & McCall, 1976. 
13 
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E[W) " 
Figure 6 : A distribution of wage offers 
The expected costs of search for a job that pays the reservation wage or more, are: 
(11.16) (C - b) . D* 
while the expected income E(y) of continued search is: 
JwT f ( w ) - w dw 
(11.17) = E (w | w > wr) 
IJ°r f(w) dw 
Equation (11.17) is an expression of the expected benefits of continued search under the condition that 
the offered wage is equal or larger than the reservation wage. Using equation (11.15) we can rewrite 
these expected benefits of continued search to: 
(H.17') J J f(w).w dw . D* 
The reservation wage is chosen by solving for wr in: 
(11.18) wr = J w " f(w).w dw . D* - (C - b) . D* 
/ The reservation wage can be viewed as the opportunity costs of continued search, having received an 
j offer wf. These opportunity costs must be equal to the expected net benefits of continued search (the 
difference between expected income and costs of continued search). 
This equation can be rearranged to: 
(11.19) (C - b) = J w ; (w - wr) . f(w) dw 
The reservation wage is set to such level that the marginal cost of searching an extra period (C - b), 
is equal to the expected marginal return to this search, J w ° (w - wr) . f(w) dw. In (11.19) the relation 
between the costs of search and the reservation wage is negative: when the marginal cost of search 
14 
increases, the expected marginal return to search has to increase too; the reservation wage is 
decreased to a level at which the marginal cost and marginal return to search are equal again. 
The effects of the level of unemployment benefits on the behaviour of the job searcher are easily 
derived: an increase in the level of unemployment benefits causes a fall in the costs of search; accor-
ding to equation (11.19) this will lead to a higher reservation wage and thus to a longer period of 
search (in equation (11.15) p falls and D rises). In this simple model the effects of higher unemploy-
ment benefits are straightforward: higher benefits increase the reservation wage, lengthen the duration 
of unemployment and increase the post-unemployment wage of the job searcher. 
The relation between benefits and unemployment duration and post-unemployment wages, strongly 
depends on the assumptions of the search model and the shape of the benefit system. 
We first look at four changes in the assumptions of the basic job search model which lead to the 
rejection of the hypothesis of a constant reservation wage during search. First, workers can face a 
finite time horizon: when approaching retirement the return to search declines and the reservation 
wage is lowered. Secondly, we should reckon with risk averse job searchers. When we assume that job 
searchers become more risk averse when their wealth decreases, they will take less risk and lower 
their reservation wages during unemployment: the (life-time) wealth of the job searchers declines 
during unemployment, because of search costs and approaching retirement . A third reason for 
declining reservation wages during the search period is that workers' search does not have to be 
random: searchers can rank firms and proceed from higher to lower paying firms. Finally it is possible 
that job searchers do not know the actual distribution of wages as is assumed by the basic job search 
model and that they use job offers as a source of information about this distribution. In the case of 
such an adaptive search process, observed reservation wages may decline during search because 
overoptimistic job searchers revise their reservation wages when they get more information about the 
wage offer distribution . In the above cases the optimal strategy is no longer to choose a constant 
reservation wage, but to adapt this reservation wage during the unemployment spell, hence wr becomes 
w f t. Declining reservation wages during the search period could be a reason for the empirical finding 
that post-unemployment wages are not increased by higher unemployment benefits, as predicted by the 
simple search model: when benefits rise, first the reservation wage increases but because of the 
extended search period, the post-unemployment wage is not increased by the higher benefits. 
Another assumption of the simple job search model, an unemployed worker getting exactly one job 
offer per period, is dropped by Blau and Robins . In their model a job searcher can change his 
search intensity by devoting less or more resources to job search. In the opinion of Blau and Robins 
higher unemployment benefits go together with a reduction in the search intensity and hence with 
longer unemployment durations. They show that the conclusion of the Standard search model that 
there is a positive relation between unemployment benefits and unemployment duration is not 
necessarily a consequence of higher reservation wages, but could also be the result of lower job-offer 
arrival rates because of the reduced search intensity. Blau and Robins further point to the fact that 
the wage offer distribution can shift and does not need to be independent of the unemployment 
19
 See Classen, 1976, pp. 196-197 and Lippman & McCall, 1979, pp. 166-173. 
2 0
 See Classen, 1976, pp. 197-198. Lippman and McCall show that in the case of adaptive search 
policies it is possible that the adoption of a reservation wage is not the optimal search strategy (see 
Lippman & McCall, 1979, pp. 173-174). 
See Blau & Robins, 1986. 
15 
insurance system. First there can be an effect of increased imemployment benefits on the wage offers 
because employers want to minimise their turnover costs and react by raising their wages to be able 
to 'compete' with the unemployment insurance system. Second, wage offers can also be affected by the 
fact that benefits induce unemployed people to seek out the more productive firms. In both cases, the 
reservation wage rises when unemployment benefits are increased, but not as a consequence of the 
subsidization of search but because of a shift in the wage offer distribution. 
Some authors drop the assumption of the basic job search model of a constant job offer arrival 
rate (one a day) for all unemployed people . They think the long-term unemployed receive a very 
low rate of job offers, which together with "the well-documented unpleasantness of long-term 
unemployment" leads to very low reservation wages (below the minimum point on the wage offer 
distribution). The long-term unemployed will then follow the strategy of accepting the first job offered 
and their duration of unemployment becomes fully dependent on the job offer arrival rate. Within 
limits, higher benefits will not influence the duration of unemployment for these people. 
Narendranathan et al. point to the fact that the density of the wage distribution may differ for 
various groups of job searchers. This is important for the effect that a rise in the reservation wage will 
have on unemployment duration: when an unemployed person has a reservation wage which is situated 
in a dense part of the wage distribution, a rise in the reservation wage cuts out many jobs . The 
authors' suggestion is that certain groups of people (for example young workers) will face a more 
dense wage distribution with a lower variance than others. For these groups of people a rise of 
unemployment benefits and the reservation wage has larger consequences for the duration of 
unemployment than for people who face a wage distribution with more variance. 
When we take the actual shape of the benefit system into account, the effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration and post-unemployment wages change considerably, compared with 
the results of the basic job search model. 
In most unemployment insurance systems the eligibility for benefits is restricted. For all people who 
are not (fully) qualified for unemployment benefits -like non-participants, new entrants in the labour 
force, job quitters and part-timers- higher benefits are an incentive to supply more labour so that they 
can become eligible for benefits in the future. This 'entitlement effect' of higher unemployment 
benefits could lead to lower reservation wages and shorter unemployment durations for some of the 
groups mentioned above, like new entrants and job quitters . 
In contrast with the assumption in the Standard search model that benefits are infinitely available, 
most unemployment insurance systems have a maximum benefit period. This finite benefit period leads 
to a declining reservation wage during the unemployment spell (again wr should be replaced by w f t): 
when a worker comes nearer to exhaustion of unemployment benefits, the expected costs of further 
search increase and he will lower his reservation wage accordingly. A second effect of a maximum 
benefit period is that higher benefits can result in shorter unemployment durations: for those job 
searchers who are near the end of their benefit period, higher payments increase the value of working 
^ See Nickell, 1979b, p. 38 and Narendranathan et al., 1985, p. 322. 
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 See Narendranathan et al., 1985, p. 322. 
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 See Narendranathan et al., 1985, p. 312. 
2 5
 See section 2.2 of this paper, in which the entitlement effect on labour force participation was 
discussed already. See also Hamermesh, 1979. 
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(including future unemployment insurance payments, given a certain probability of a layoff) by more 
than the value of their current payments. As a result these job searchers will reduce their reservation 
wages and their unemployment duration will be shortened26. Burdett concludes that because of the 
fïnite benefit period, the effect of higher benefits will be to lengthen the unemployment duration of 
the short-term unemployed while the unemployment duration of the long-term unemployed will fall27. 
Changes in the maximum length of the benefit period will influence the behaviour of job searchers, 
dependent on their benefit status . When the benefit period is extended, the short-term unemployed 
will increase their reservation wages and their unemployment duration will be lengthened. On the 
contrary, people who are near exhaustion of their benefïts will lower their reservation wages and they 
will face shorter unemployment spells after the extension of the maximum benefit period (see above 
for the same effect of higher benefits on these 'near-exhaustees'). For those job searchers who are not 
entitled to benefits, an extended benefit period will have the same effect as higher unemployment 
benefits: they will lower their reservation wages and will experience shorter unemployment durations. 
We summarize the most important effects of unemployment benefits, according to the search 
model: 
-in the simple search model higher unemployment benefits lead to an increase of reservation wages, 
longer unemployment durations and higher post-unemployment wages; 
-when we drop simplifying assumptions of this model, the positive effect of higher benefits on post-
unemployment wages vanishes; 
-for the long-term unemployed the effect of higher benefits on unemployment duration will be absent; 
-for unemployed people who face a dense wage distribution like young workers, the effect of higher 
benefits on unemployment durations will be larger than for others; 
-when we reckon with restricted eligibility for benefits, people who are not entitled to unemployment 
insurance will lower their reservation wages and will face shorter unemployment durations when 
benefits are increased or when the maximum benefit period is extended; 
-when we take finite availability of benefits into account, higher benefits or a longer maximum benefit 
period will lengthen the unemployment duration of the short-term unemployed, while the unemploy-
ment duration of the long-term unemployed is reduced. 
2 6
 See Mortensen, 1977, p. 506. 
2 7
 See Burdett, 1979, p. 334. 
2 8
 See Mortensen, 1977, pp. 512-513. 
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Section 3: The effects of unemployment insurance in empirical studies 
3.1 Introduction 
| In this section we review empirical studies on the relation between unemployment insurance and 
4nemployment. These studies mainly focus on the effect of the level of unemployment benefits on the 
livel or duration of unemployment. Empirical information about the effects on labour supply and 
demand of the financing of unemployment benefits appears to be rather scarce. 
The empirical studies reviewed here are of two kinds. The ürst considers the influence of 
; unemployment insurance at the macro-economie level. Movements in aggregate unemployment are 
related to a measure of the level of unemployment benefits. Some of these time-series studies use a 
very simple reduced-form equation for unemployment (see section 3.2.2) while others use a more 
sophisticated model of the labour market. In this context it is important to make a distinction be-
tween equilibrium and disequilibrium models of the labour market: in a model with a clearing labour 
market (section 3.2.4), we can expect the effect of the level of benefits on unemployment to be larger 
jthan in a model with a fixed wage rate above market-clearing level (section 3.2.5). A common 
jproperty of nearly all the aggregate time-series studies is that they are (in many cases implicitly) based 
on the static, neo-classical model of the labour market (section 2.2. of this paper ). 
The second kind of empirical studies, considered in section 3.3. uses the job search model as the 
starting point. They relate data on the duration of unemployment of a large number of individuals to 
characteristics of these individuals, like age, work experience, qualifications and the level of unemploy-
ment benefits or the replacement ratio. We review the results of a number of these studies, carried 
out for the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands. They all point in roughly the 
same direction: the level of unemployment benefits has a significant, but small positive effect on the 
duration of unemployment. 
3.2 Unemployment insurance in aggregate time-series studies 
3.2.1 Unemployment insurance in UV-studies 
A plot of time-series data for the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed invariably 
shows an inverse relationship between these two variables (see figure 7, for an example for the 
Netherlands). The theoretical explanations for the existence of such an 'UV-curve' are: 
1) the aggregate labour market is segmented; some of the submarkets have vacancies while others 
experience excess-supply; so on the macro-economie level unemployment and vacancies can go 
together; 
2) employers and workers have to search for the right employee and the right job respectively; as this 
search costs time, unemployment and vacancies can coexist. 
Movements in the UV-curve may, among others, be explained by the level of unemployment 
benefits. Using the static neo-classical model of the labour market, higher unemployment benefits may 
lead to the consumption of more leisure, a fall in the effective supply of labour and a rise in the level 
of unemployment. At the same level of vacancies, unemployment will be higher. This means an 
outward shift of the UV-curve. In the search-theoretical explanation of the UV-curve, higher benefits 
can lead to higher reservation wages and reduced search intensity, resulting in longer unemployment 
durations and again in an outward shift of the UV-curve. 
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Our brief review of empirical research on the relation between the level of unemployment benefits 
and the UV-curve starts with söme studies on social security in the United Kingdom which was 
changed significantly in 1965 and 1966. 
-in 1965 the Redundancy Payments Act passed; this act required employers to make lump-sum 
compensation payments (redundancy payments) to redundant employees; 
-the National Insurance Act that passed in 1966, meant the replacement of the old flat-rate unemploy-
ment benefit system by a mix of flat-rate benefits with earnings-related benefits. 
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Figure 7 : The UV-curve for the Netherlands, 1960-1988 
Source : Van Ours, p. 11 
In the last quarter of 1966 the until that time stable relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies (the UV-relation) in the United Kingdom started to move upwards. Gujarati pointed out the 
striking simultaneity in timing between the passing of the new social security acts and the breakdown 
of the UV-relation . He attributed the increase in unemployment to the extended job search of 
unemployed people. Taylor on the contrary, asserts that the rise of unemployment relative to the num-
ber of vacancies in the United Kingdom was caused by a reduction in 'labour hoarding' in 1967 and 
196830. According to this author a 'shake out of labour' had taken place in these years. This shake out 
could be caused by business pessimism and the existence of the redundancy benefits. Evans gives yet 
another explanation for the 1966/1967-shift in the UV-curve in Great Britain31. He claims that the 
29 
30 
See Gujarati, 1972. 
See Taylor, 1972. 
31 See Evans, 1977. 
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changes in social security in 1965 and 1966 induced the until then unregistered unemployed persons, 
to register as unemployed. It became more worthwhile to register, especially for the 'higher paid' 
unemployed workers32. Duffy concludes on the basis of an estimated dynamic unemployment 
adjustment equation and the matching specification of the UV-curve that "the replacement ratio may 
have been the prime mover in the outward shift of the UV curve in the late 1960s ...',33. 
Next we survey studies for the Netherlands, in which an unemployment benefit variable is included 
in the UV-relation. De Neubourg incorporates a weighted benefit-wage ratio in a loglinear UV-curve 
for the period 1955-1980 . The coëfficiënt of the weighted replacement ratio is significant, while the 
coëfficiënt of the unweighted replacement ratio is not significant. De Neubourg concludes that the 
impact of the weighted replacement ratio on unemployment is of a cyclical character. Mulder and Van 
Schaik add the log of the replacement ratio to a loglinear error-correction UV-relation for the Nether-
lands (period 1955-1987) . The long run elasticity of unemployment to the replacement ratio is about 
unity. In a recent study by Van Ours for the period 1961-1987, which explicitly reckons with flows on 
the labour market, the matching of vacancies and unemployment significantly decreases when the 
replacement ratio rises . However, according to the author, the level of unemployment benefits can 
not explain the fall of efficiency of the Dutch labour market at the end of the sixties, nor can it 
explain the huge rise of unemployment in the Netherlands at the beginning of the eighties. 
Summarizing this brief review of UV-analysis in which unemployment benefit variables play a part, 
there seems to be some indication that higher benefits lower the efficiency of the labour market, 
causing the UV-curve to shift outward. 
3.2.2 Unemployment Insurance in the Grubel/Maki/Spindler model 
The study of Grubel and Maki on the effects of unemployment benefits on the level of unemploy-
ment in the United States, is founded on a micro-economie framework that resembles the static neo-
Evans shows that the UV-curve for females did not shift significantly, which is in agreement 
with the fact that most females were not entitled to unemployment benefits. 
3 3
 See Duffy, 1984, p. 168. 
See De Neubourgh, 1985. The weighted benefit-wage ratio is measured as the quotiënt of the 
mean unemployment benefit multiplied by the number of beneficiaries and the modal wage multiplied 
by the number of employees. Because of the weights (number of beneficiaries and employees), this 
benefit-wage ratio has a cyclical character. 
See Mulder & Van Schaik, 1989. The replacement ratio is calculated as the mean yearly 
unemployment benefit divided by the net weekly wage of a male worker in the manufacturing industry 
multiplied by 52. 
See Van Ours, 1990. Van Ours estimates a matching function, i.e. a function which describes 
the relation between the flow of filled vacancies and the stocks of job seekers and vacancies. The 
influence of the level of unemployment benefits is measured by including the numerical estimates of 
the replacement ratio by Mulder & Van Schaik in the matching function. 
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classical model which we discussed in section 2.237. Grubel and Maki come to the conclusion that 
unemployment benefits will increase the consumption of leisure by inducing voluntary layoffs and by 
lengthening the duration of unemployment. 
Grubel and Maki regard the ratio of benefits to earnings from work (the 'replacement ratio') as 
the central variable that influences the labour supply decision and consequently the level of unemploy-
ment. In section 2.2 we showed that in a 'simple' unemployment insurance system, the level of wages 
and the difference between wage rate and benefit level (or the level of wages and the replacement 
ratio) are the determinants of labour supply (see equation (ü.6) and (H.6')). In a more realistic 
unemployment insurance system both the qualification period and the maximum benefit period as well 
as the levels of wages and benefits affect optimum labour supply. So in our opinion there is little 
theoretical reason to consider the replacement ratio as the one and only measure of the influence of 
the unemployment insurance system. 
Grubel and Maki use of a two equation model: 
(11.20) In U = aQ + a^ RR + a2 INEL + <*3 Y + a 4 Y_, 
(11.21) RR = B„ + B, U + B2 t 
in which: U = unemployment rate 
RR = average unemployment benefit per week for an unemployed worker divided by 
the average weekly wage of a worker (replacement ratio) 
INEL = a proxy for the strength of enforcement of inehgibility for unemployment benefits 
Y = gross national product 
t = time 
Equation (1) is a semi-logarithmic specification, which implies that 3U/3RR = a1 U ; the effect of a 
higher replacement ratio is larger when unemployment is already high. So, Grubel and Maki assume 
that benefit-induced unemployment is itself a function of the level of unemployment: persons who are 
cyclically or structurally unemployed consume more leisure (are unemployed for a longer time) when 
benefits are higher. INEL, a measure of the strength of enforcement of unemployment insurance 
inehgibility, is assumed to have a negative effect on the level of unemployment. The current and 
lagged percentage change in gross national product reflect cyclical variations in demand and unemploy-
ment. Structural unemployment is assumed to be measured by the intercept of the equation. 
The second equation is included because Grubel and Maki assume that the replacement ratio 
depends on the state of the business cycle. According to the authors, average benefits tend to rise 
when unemployment increases because the skill mix of the unemployed rises. As wages tend to be 
lower when unemployment is high, the replacement ratio should be a negative function of the level of 
unemployment. 
3
 See Grubel & Maki, 1976. This paper and the study of Maki & Spindler on the United 
Kingdom (Maki & Spindler, 1975) are the most important examples of this kind of empirical work. 
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Table 1 : Results of empirical studies with the GMS-model 
Study (author, year of pub- Elasticity of unemployment rate 
lication, country and to replacement ratio* 
estimation period) 
1) Grubel, Maki & Sax (1975) 
Canada, time-series, 1953-1972 0.7 
2) Maki & Spindler (1975) 
a) United Kingdom, time-series, 
1952-1972, total unemployment 
0.6 
b) United Kingdom, time-series, 
1952-1972, male unemployment 
0.7 
3) Grubel & Maki (1976) 
a) U.S.A., time-series, 1951-1972 6.0 
b) U.S.A., cross-section, 
48 states, 1971 
0.9 
4) Gérard, Glejser & Vuchelen (1978) 
Belgium, time-series, 1954-1974 3.0 
5) Maki & Spindler (1978) 
a) pooled cross-section/time-series 
across eight countries** 
1.2 
1 b) pooled cross-section/time-series 
1 across sixteen countries*** 
1 
0.7 
* Elasticities are calculated at the mean of the replacement ratio. 
** The eight countries are: Canada, France, Sweden, Germany, Japan, 
Italy, United Kingdom and United States. The authors used a total 
of 46 observations. 
*** The above countries plus Belgium, Finland, Greece, Spain, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand and Cyprus (a total of 87 obser-
vations) . 
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The two-equation framework described above has been the basis for empirical research on the 
relation between aggregate unemployment and the level of unemployment benefits. This framework 
has been used in time-series' studies for several countries as well as in cross-section analyses. Table 1 
gives a review of the most important studies38. 
The Grubel/Maki/Spindler (GMS) model has been subject to much criticism. First and most 
important point of critique is the interpretation of the unemployment equation. When it is regarded as 
a reduced form, one wonders what the structural model looks like. Which variables should be included 
in the unemployment equation and which should not be? This problem is caused by the lack of an 
explicit relation between the micro-economie foundation and the macro-economie specification of the 
unemployment relation in the model. A second line of criticism focuses on the empirical work with 
the GMS model. It is possible that the replacement ratio functions as a time trend in the unemploy-
ment equation as both the replacement ratio and the unemployment rate have risen gradually over 
time. The coëfficiënt of the replacement ratio would not reflect the unemployment-inducing effect then 
but just the secular rise in unemployment, probably caused by a totally different factor. To quote 
Nickell39: 
"... much of the statistical impact of the replacement ratio in the post-war studies arises because 
both it and the level of unemployment have risen secularly over most of the last twenty years. 
The inclusion of any other variable which moves monotonically over time will ... tend to reduce 
this impact. Given also that the theoretical basis of these equations is weak, we are then left 
with virtually no statistical or prior criteria for choosing between results." 
The critique of Cubbin and Foley is in line with the Nickell-argument and focuses on the 
Maki/Spindler paper on the United Kingdom . Cubbin and Foley argue that it is incorrect to omit a 
'wealth variable' in the unemployment equation. This wealth variable should represent the positive 
effect of rising real incomes in Britain over the estimation period on the demand for leisure (and 
consequently on unemployment). When Cubbin and Foley estimate unemployment equations which 
include such a wealth variable (permanent income), the coëfficiënt of the replacement ratio is not 
significant. This could indicate that in the Grubel/Maki/Spindler model the replacement ratio indeed 
functions as a 'proxy* for the rise in real incomes. In that case the income effect of the rise in 
permanent income and not the increase in unemployment benefits would be responsible for the high 
unemployment in the post-war United Kingdom. 
Sawyer criticizes the work of Maki and Spindler on the United Kingdom for several reasons 1. First 
he claims that Maki and Spindler use the wrong replacement ratio. Sawyer states that before 1966 
most unemployed persons' incomes were determined by supplementary benefits which exceeded 
unemployment benefits used by Maki and Spindler. Furthermore, earnings related supplement (ERS)-
benefits, which were introduced in 1966, were only important for high-wage employees and not for the 
bulk of the unemployed. This means that the rise in the replacement ratio in 1966 was not as large as 
See for results for other countries like New Zealand, Sweden, Ireland, France and The Federal 
Republic of Germany, Grubel & Walker, 1978. 
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 See Nickell, 1979b, p. 35. 
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 See Cubbin & Foley, 1977. 
See Sawyer, 1979. 
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Maki and Spindler assume. Sawyer shows that the calculations of Maki and Spindler on the ERS-
induced imemployment in 1966 must be incorrect: the number of unemployed actually receiving ERS 
was smaller than the calculated ERS-induced unemployment by Maki and Spindler for almost the 
entire period 1968-1972. However, Sawyer's estimations of the original Maki and Spindler model with 
a new replacement ratio did not show significantly different results for the coëfficiënt of the replace-
ment ratio. Sawyer does show that the significance of this coëfficiënt is rather sensitive for a change in 
the estimation period: when he estimates the unemployment equation over a slightly shorter period 
(1956-1972) than Maki and Spindler, the estimated coëfficiënt becomes not significant. 
In short, the inclusion of the replacement ratio in a macro-economie unemployment equation is a 
questionable method of measuring the influence of unemployment insurance on the level of unemploy-
ment. The lack of a link between micro-economie theory and the macro-economie unemployment 
equation, the possibly 'artificial' correlation between the secular rise of the replacement ratio and 
unemployment and the problem of calculating the correct replacement ratio all serve to cast doubt on 
the Grubel/Maki/Spindler method. 
3.2.3 Unemployment insurance in macro-economie escape rate equations for Sweden 
The past two decades saw substantial extensions of unemployment compensation in Sweden. There 
has also been a trend increase in the duration of Swedish unemployment in this period. Björklund and 
Holmlund estimate escape rate equations for Sweden, in which they relate the probability of leaving 
unemployment to the replacement ratio and two dummies which reflect increases in the maximum 
unemployment benefit period42. Further they include the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio 
(capturing the probability of getting a job offer) and a time trend. They estimate separate equations 
for the short-term unemployed (1-13 weeks), medium-term unemployed (14-26 weeks) and long-term 
unemployed (27-39 weeks) on quarterly data for the period 1965-1984. Their results on the coeffi-
cients of the replacement ratio and the two benefit period dummies are small and imprecise in most 
cases: generally, these coefficients have the predicted (negative) sign but are not significant. 
Next the authors compare the model predictions of the number of unemployed in 1986 with a 
simulation of the number of unemployed in the same year for the benefit system prevailing in 1965. 
The calculated impact of the rise in the replacement ratio and the two extensions of the maximum 
benefit period between 1965 and 1984 in Sweden, is an increase of unemployment of around 25 
percent. Comparing this maximum influence of the more generous unemployment benefit system with 
the actual doubling of unemployment in Sweden during 1965-1986, the authors conclude that "... 
extended unemployment insurance had not been a major factor behind the trend increase in 
unemployment and unemployment duration." 
*' See Björklund & Holmlund, 1989, pp. 171-172. 
4 3
 See Björklund & Holmlund, p. 176. The 25 percent increase in unemployment between 1965 
and 1986, is the maximum impact of the extended unemployment insurance system, in the sense that 
the authors used the estimations in which the coefficients of the replacement ratio and the benefit 
period dummies were the largest. 
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3.2.4 Unemployment insurance in an aggregated equilïbrium model 
Minford has published several studies on the growth of unemployment in Europe in the last two 
decades . He uses a new classical model of the labour market to explain this increase in the number 
of unemployed people. The micro-economie framework that Minford adopts strongly resembles the 
static neo-classical model which we discussed in section 2.2 of this paper . The reason to use this 
model instead of the job search model is that Minford believes that the vast mass of people know 
their 'going wage rate' and do not have to search for the right job45. In the Minford model the labour 
market is segmented in a union sector, that does not clear because the unions are able to put a mark-
up on the competitive wage level and a competitive sector that absorbs the excess supply of the union 
sector. In this competitive sector the flexible wage rate takes care of market clearing. A worker who is 
not employed in the union sector now faces the Standard optimization problem jf maximizing his 
utility, given the level of the net wage in the competitive sector and the unemployment benefit. Higher 
unemployment benefits (relative to the level of net wages) will lead people to consume more leisure 
and thus to supply less labour. 
This labour market theory is combined with a classical macro-economie model for an open 
economy in which production is determined by capacity and the current balance is in equilibrium. The 
partial elasticity of unemployment to the replacement ratio (derived directly from the estimation of an 
unemployment equation by Minford) is 4.5 for the United Kingdom. This is very large, compared with 
the elasticity of 0.6 found by Maki & Spindler for the U.K.. Minford's preferred estimate of the full 
model elasticity of unemployment in the U.K. to the level of benefits is 2.846. The elasticity of 
unemployment to a percentage point change in employees' taxes and national insurance contributions 
is also 2.8, while the elasticity to a percentage point change in employer's tax rates is 5.9. 
Hence, the effects of changes in unemployment benefits are very large in the Minford model and 
not in line with most other empirical findings on this subject. One reason for this is the equilibrium 
approach that Minford adopts: as already discussed in section 2.2, the effects of higher benefïts and 
employees' contributions can be expected to be larger in a clearing labour market model47. Another 
reason for Minford's results could be the presence of specifkation errors in his model. Nickell for 
example argued that the absence of labour productivity in Minford's wage equation (which is in fact a 
rewritten labour supply relation) leads to an artificially large effect of unemployment benefits and 
employees' taxes and contributions on unemployment . 
44 See Minford, 1983, 1985b and 1986. 
4 5
 However, Minford acknowledges that for some groups on the labour market, such as 
professional people the job search model will be relevant. See Minford, 1983, p. 213. 
Unemployment is expressed in the number of unemployed here. 
4 7
 This does not hold in the case of employers' contributions. 
48 See Nickell, 1984a. 
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3.2.5 Unemployment insurance in two disequilibrium models 
In a study for the Netherlands, Springer et al. examine the effects of social security (including the 
unemployment insurance system) in a two equation model for the labour market49. They estimate a 
wage equation and an employment (or unemployment) equation. The authors use a disequilibrium 
approach, in which employers' organizations and unions bargain about the wage rate and employers 
determine the level of employment. It is implicitly assumed that the supply of labour was rationed on 
the Dutch labour market in the estimation period (1964-1984). 
In the estimations of the employment and unemployment equations, unemployment insurance plays 
its part: first, unemployment benefits are partially financed by employers' contributions in the 
Netherlands, so these contributions are a fraction of the costs of labour for the employer. The 
estimated elasticity of employment in companies to real labour cost is -0.25 in the short run and -0.35 
in the long run. Second, in the disequilibrium model of Springer et al., higher unemployment benefits 
are modelled to influence unemployment directly by stimulating labour force participation (in our 
terms the 'entitlement effect', see section 2.2) or by inducing layoffs and unstable employment (see 
section 2.3). The coëfficiënt of the replacement ratio has the expected (positive) sign in the unemploy-
ment equation but is not significant. The implied elasticity of the number of unemployed to the 
replacement ratio is around 3. 
Springer et al. also estimate a wage equation according to which higher unemployment benefits 
lead to higher wage demands in the negotiations between unions and employers and to falling 
employment (depending on the size of the elasticity of employment to real labour costs). The replace-
ment ratio has the expected positive sign in the estimated real labour costs equations, but does not 
significantly differ from zero in all cases. The financing of the benefits causes a second effect of an 
extension of the unemployment insurance system on the level of wages. Higher contributions to be 
paid by employers lead (ceteris paribus) to rising real labour costs. However, employers may 'shift 
back' a part of this increasbg burden to their employees by lowering gross wages. The empirical 
results of Springer et al. on this backward shifting are ambiguous. It is also possible that higher 
contributions to be paid by employees lead to rising real labour costs. When workers want to maintain 
net wages when their unemployment insurance contributions rise, they have to demand higher gross 
wages. Hence, when employees succeed in this 'forward shifting' of increasing contributions, this leads 
to higher real labour costs for the employer. The estimates indicate that around 40 percent of 
increases in the burden of employees are shifted to employers. 
Springer et al. conclude that the main influence of social security on unemployment in the 
Netherlands results from the effects of the financing of these benefits on labour demand and not so 
much from the effects of benefits on labour supply. However, we should keep in mind that this 
conclusion can be influenced by the authors' choice for a disequilibrium approach . 
Rice examines whether the large growth in juvenile unemployment (especially relative to that 
among other age groups) in Great Britain in the seventies was caused by the general decline in 
economie activity, which affected juveniles more severely than adults or by structural factors within the 
See Springer, Vijlbrief & Gompaijen, 1988. 
See section 2.2 and Den Butter and Compaijen, p. 16. 
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British labour market . Among these structural factors are an increased eligibihty for state benefits 
for school leavers and less strict workseeking requirements for benefit recipients. The model estimated 
by Rice allows for several possible regimes on the labour market: market clearing by instantaneous 
wage adjustment or quantity rationing, in which case supply- and demand-constrained regimes are 
possible. 
The results of Rice's estimations lead to a rejection of the market clearing hypothesis in favour of 
the quantity rationing alternative for the British juvenile labour market in the period 1953-1979. For 
male juveniles, the labour market was supply-constrained during the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1971/1972 
it was demand-constrained. The labour market for juvenile females experienced excess demand in the 
fifties and sixties (with an exception for 1963/4-1965/6, when juvenile female labour supply exceeded 
demand) and was demand-constrained since 1970/1. Turning to the results on the effects of the level 
of unemployment benefits on juvenile unemployment now, the results cl Rice indicate that higher 
benefits lead to a reduction of effective labour supply and a rise of voluntary unemployment, in the 
case of a supply constraint on the British juvenile labour market. When this labour market is demand-
constrained as it was in the seventies, the influence of higher benefits is confined to its probably 
positive effects on labour force participation52. For juvenile males this effect is negligible while fe-
males do increase their labour force participation when unemployment benefits are higher. 
The conclusion of Rice on the causes of the increase in juvenile unemployment in Great Britain 
during the seventies is that the effect of the more generous benefit system appears to have been not 
significant for juvenile males and that: "In the case of juvenile females, there is some evidence that a 
decline in the level of net earnings relative to unemployment benefits is associated with an increase in 
labour force participation rates, and hence may contribute to higher levels of unemployment."53. This 
effect however, is very small: only about five percent of the observed rise of female juvenile unem-
ployment can be ascribed to a rise in the level of benefits relative to net earnings. 
3.3 Unemployment insurance in studies with micro-economie data 
In section 2.3.2 we summarized the possible effects of unemployment benefits in the job search 
model. First we investigate the consequences of higher benefits for the duration of unemployment. 
Table 2 gives a review of a number of studies for the United Kingdom and the United States which 
relate the unemployment duration of individuals to certain characteristics. One of these characteristics 
is the level of unemployment benefits or the replacement ratio. The other variables which explain the 
length of an unemployment spell, are (partially) derived from the job search model. Among these 
variables are the age, work experience, qualifications and marital status of the unemployed person. 
However, a general drawback of this empirical work is the absence of a strong link between the 
theoretical job search model and an empirical specification of an unemployment duration model. To 
See Rice. The reasons why juveniles can be more adversely affected by a slump are among 
others the lower fïrm-specific human capital of young workers and institutional procedures ('last-in, 
first-out'). 
5 2
 The 'entitlement effect', see section 2.2. 
See Rice, p. 369. 
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quote Atkinson et al. : "... even the simplest search theory does not lead to a convenient functional 
form ...". 
The studies in table 2 show that the results of Nickell, Lancaster, Classen and Newton & Rosen 
are roughly the same: a one percent rise of unemployment benefits (or the replacement ratio) 
increases the duration of unemployment by about half a percent55. This similarity in results led 
Lancaster to the following conclusion in 197956: 
"... an elasticity of this order could now be regarded as established beyond reasonable doubt." 
In a review of the effects of income transfer programs on work, savings and the income distribution in 
the United Sates, Danziger et al. claim that57: 
"... despite the problems, a positive relation between unemployment insurance and duration of 
unemployment appears robust." 
For the Netherlands a number of similar studies is reviewed by Groot & Jehoel-Gijsbers . Their 
conclusion is that the elasticity of unemployment duration to the level of benefits varies between 0.4 
and 0.6. This result is in line with the findings in table 2 but we must take into account that many 
studies for the Netherlands fmd a not significant effect of benefits on duration. 
As yet, the influence of benefits on unemployment duration is not as firmly established as stated 
above. Apart from the theoretical problem of specifying an unemployment duration model on the basis 
of the job search model, Atkinson et al. show that using alternative benefit variables, different 
specifications of the replacement ratio and different time periods lead to considerable variation in the 
estunated elasticity . They are able to reproduce the elasticity of unemployment duration to benefits 
of 0.6, but under assumptions which are equally reasonable, they find elasticities which do not 
significantly differ from zero. 
The role of varying aggregate labour market conditions in studies with micro-economie data also 
requires our attention. Most of the work in table 2 relates to periods when unemployment was much 
lower than in the late seventies and early eighties. In these latter periods, unemployment was most 
likely of a disequilibrium character, caused by severe demand constraints on the labour market (see 
section 3.2.5). As people are restricted in their 'choice' between working and being unemployed in 
such a situation, we can expect that the effect of the level of benefits on unemployment duration was 
smaller in the late seventies and early eighties than in earlier periods. An indication for the relevance 
of this remark are the smaller elasticities of unemployment duration to benefits, found in the last two 
studies of table 2 which use more recent data sets. 
54
 See Atkinson, Gomulka, Micklewright & Rau, 1984, p. 5. 
55
 A rise of the replacement ratio with ten percentage points (i.e. a rise of benefits with about 
twenty percent) leads to approximately one week extra unemployment. 
56
 See Lancaster, 1979, p. 956. 
57
 Danziger et al., 1981, p. 992. 
58
 See Groot & Jehoel-Gijsbers, 1989, p. 9. 
59
 See Atkinson et al., 1984. 
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Table 2 : The effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration 
(Studies for the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.A.)) 
Study (year) Sample (country, 
size, sex & year) 
Elasticity Effect of increase 
of duration in benefits on weeks 
to benefits* of unemployment 
1) Ehrenberg & 
Oaxaca (1976) 
U.S.A., 1792, male 
& female, 1966-71 
n.a. RR +0.10 (0.40 - 0.50) 
males (> 45 years) 
females (30-44) 
males (14-24) 
females (14-24) 
+1.5 
+0.3 
+0.2 
+0 5 
2) Nickell (1979b) U.K., 426, male, 
1972 
3) Lancaster (1979) U.K., 479, male, 
1973 
4) d a s s e n (1979) U.S.A. , ± 15000, 
male & fem., 1967-68 
5) Newton & Rosen U.S.A., 627, male 
(1979) & female, 1974-76 
6) Moffit & Nichol- U.S.A., 1071, male 
son (1982) & female, 1974-77 
EER = 0 .6 
EKK - 0-6 
ERR _ 
0.6 
J(w-b) 
• 0 . 5 * * 
n . a . 
RR +0.10 (0.40 - 0.50) 
± 1.0 week longer 
RR +0.10 leads to 1.8 
weeks longer 
RR +0.10: 
males : +1.0 weeks 
females : +0.8 weeks 
7) Atkinson et a l . 
(1984) 
8) Narendranathan 
et al. (1985) 
9) Blau & Robins 
(1986) 
U.K. , 1231, male, 
1972-77 
U.K., 1471, male, 
1978-1979 
U.S.A., 2928, male 
& female, 1979-1980 
not robust*** 
Ej, = 0.28 -
0.36 
E,, = 0.18 
males : 0.18 
females : 0.26 
** 
">\ "$C "TC 
Some studies in this table use the elasticity of unemployment duration in 
weeks to the replacement ratio (E^), while others use the elasticity to the 
level of benefits (Eb) . 
Newton and Rosen calculate the elasticity of unemployment duration to the 
opportunity costs of unemployment (the level of wages minus benefits), 
E(w-b)-
Atkinson et al. find various values for this elasticity, some of them 
significant while others are not significant. Their conclusion is that the 
elasticity has not been determined robustly yet (see text). 
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In section 2.3.2 we discussed the possibility that higher unemployment benefits do not increase the 
unemployment duration of the long-term unemployed. Nickell and Narendranathan et al. indeed show 
in their studies mentioned in table 2, that for people who have been unemployed for over 6 months, 
the level of benefits has a negligible influence on the duration of unemployment. Narendranathan et 
al. also find a marked difference in the impact of unemployment benefits across age groups: for 
teenagers, the elasticity of the expected unemployment duration to benefits is 0.65 while it falls to 0.08 
for older workers. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of younger workers having a more 
dense wage distribution. 
A final remark on the relation between the level of benefits and the duration of unemployment 
concerns 'entitlement effects' of higher benefits (see sections 2.2 and 2.3.2): people who are not (fully) 
qualified for benefits have an incentive to supply more labour. Hamermesh finds that for prime-age 
(part-time working!) women the disincentive and incentive effect of higher benefits are almost equal . 
The entitlement effect also causes increased labour force participation and a reduced tendency for 
unemployed people to leave the registered labour force. Several studies indeed show that a large part 
of the unemployment, caused by unemployment benefits reflects this entitlement effect on the 
registered labour supply61. 
After this discussion of the empirical results on the relation between higher benefits and the 
duration of unemployment, we now take a brief look at the findings on the effect of unemployment 
benefits on post-unemployment wages. The empirical findings are ambiguous, in agreement with the 
prediction of the search model (see section 2.3.2). A study by Holen indicates that an increase in 
weekly benefits of $10 leads to $90 dollar higher quarterly earnings of the worker after his unemploy-
ment spell62. Ehrenberg & Oaxaca also find a significant positive effect of a higher replacement ratio 
on post-unemployment wages for adults but the effect for juveniles is not significant. Classen finds an 
effect that does not significantly differ from zero over the whole sample . 
Finally, several studies indicate that the length of the potential benefit period affects the duration 
of unemployment. Three studies find that a lengthening of the maximum benefit period with one week 
expands the expected unemployment duration by about one tenth of a week. In the study by Newton 
& Rosen, one week extra potential benefit receipt leads to an increase of unemployment duration of 
about one week . 
60
 See Hamermesh, 1979, p. 331. He finds that the employment of women is hardly influenced by 
the level of unemployment benefits. Hamermesh does not study male employment, but we can expect 
the entitlement effect to be much smaller for men. 
61
 See Solon, 1979 and Barron & Mellow, 1981. 
6 2
 See Holen, 1977, p. 447. 
See Ehrenberg & Oaxaca, 1976, p. 765 and Classen, p. 213. 
64
 See the studies by Classen, Moffit & Nicholson and Newton & Rosen of table 2 and Solon, 
1979, pp. 252-253. 
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Section 4: Summarv 
i 
j 
i 
This paper introduces two models of the labour market with which we can study the effects of 
unemployment insurance. The first one is a static model of labour supply and demand, while the 
: second one reckons with flows on the labour market. In the static model unemployment benefïts have 
I a negative effect on labour supply, the financing of the benefits by employees' contributions has an 
ambiguous influence on labour supply (because of the interaction of the substitution- and income 
effect) and employers' contributions bring down labour demand because they increase the costs of 
labour. On the aggregate level it is important to distinguish between the effects of unemployment 
j insurance in a clearing labour market and the effects in a labour market, with a fixed wage rate above 
';] market-clearing level. In a clearing labour market, hijvher benefits and employees' contributions will 
j' reduce labour supply, leading to higher wages, less employment and more unemployment, while total 
; unemployment does not change in case of a labour market that is demand-constrained (unless labour 
;force participation is affected). 
In the second model unemployment insurance can influence the flow from employment to 
unemployment and vice versa. The flow to unemployment, consisting of job quitters and people who 
are laid off, may be influenced by unemployment insurance. This does not seem to be very relevant 
for the Netherlands. The possible subsidization of unstable employment by an unemployment insurance 
system is more important. The flow from unemployment to employment is analyzed within the job 
search framework. Unemployment benefits are a subsidy to job search and lengthen the duration of 
unemployment in the basic model. When dropping simplifying assumptions of the basic job search 
model and on the unemployment insurance system, this conclusion has no longer general validity. For 
example: the unemployment spell of the long-term unemployed will not be extended by higher benefits 
and non-eligibles can expected to even shorten their duration after a rise in benefïts. 
The empirical results on the relation between unemployment insurance and unemployment stem 
from two sources. Aggregate time-series studies for the United Kingdom give elasticities of unemploy-
ment to the replacement ratio ranging from 0.6 to 4.5. In similar studies for the Netherlands, 
elasticities of 1 and 3 are found. The simple macro-economic studies face difficulties with the inter-
pretation of this elasticity. In general, macro-economic research on this subject faces the problem of 
choosing the appropriate replacement ratio for the 'average unemployed worker'. 
As the second kind of empirical studies relates data on individual unemployment durations to 
benefit entitlement and other personal characteristics, it overcomes the problem of calculating the 
average replacement ratio. However, this method has its own problem of aggregation: the cross-
section elasticities of unemployment duration to the replacement ratio or the level of benefits can not 
be easily translated to the macro-economic level. When the labour market is demand-constrained, the 
macro-economic elasticity of unemployment to the level of benefits will be smaller than the elasticities 
found in the 'micro-economie' studies. These studies point to an elasticity of unemployment to benefits 
(or the replacement ratio) of 0.5. We should remember that this elasticity only applies to labour 
markets of the beginning of the seventies, since studies using more recent data-sets find smaller 
values. Moreover, for special groups in the unemployed population (juveniles or long-term unem-
ployed) the elasticity may differ considerably. 
When modelling unemployment insurance we face a number of possibilities to introducé benefits 
and contributions in small macro-economic simulation models. First, with regard to labour supply, the 
level of unemployment benefits and employees' contributions should be included in the (effective) 
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labour supply equation. Furthermore, unemployment insurance contributions but especially the level of 
benefits can act as explanatory variables for labour force participation. Information on properties of 
the unemployment insurance system, such as the length of a qualification period, the maximum benefit 
period and changes in the level of benefits during the unemployment spell, is necessary for the correct 
modelling of unemployment insurance. 
Secondly, employers' unemployment insurance contributions should of course be included in the 
labour demand equation as a part of wage costs. Unemployment insurance, or to be precise, the 
'unemployment insurance subsid/ may also be used to explain the structure of employment. 
Thirdly, the effects of unemployment insurance are dependent on the labour market regime. In our 
review of macro-economie research on the effects of unemployment insurance we came across both 
market clearing- and disequilibrium models of the labour market. In our view, there is no reason for 
an a priori choice for one of these approaches. In further research we will incorporate unemployment 
benefits and contributions in both types of models. 
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Appendix A : The derivative of labour supply to the level of unemplovment benefits 
Section 2.2. of this paper derives a labour supply function from the following optimization problem: 
maxumse 
under 
(ELI) U = (avc + 6yc)1/c 
(n.3) v = T - 1 
(II.5) y = w.1 + b.v 
in which: U = utility 
a,6= parameter 
c = coëfficiënt of substitution, such that -1/1-c = <j>, the elasticity of substitution 
v = time not spent working 
y = income available for consumption (savings are zero) 
T •= available time 
1 = labour supply 
w = real wage rate 
b = real unemployment benefit per unit of leisure 
This yields the labour supply function: 
(n.6) 1 = T - w.T.[ (w - b) + ((B/o).(w - b))1/1"0 ]'1 
The derivative of labour supply to the level of real unemployment benefits is (expected signs of the 
terms are above them): 
(+) (+) (-) 
ai r fi 1/1-c * -2 ' fi 1 fi c/l-c 
— = = w.T . ' (w - b) + [ - . (w - b)] «- r * -1 -- — • . [ - . (w - b)] 
3b o k Q 1-c at 
As the last term of this equation is negative and the two first terms are positive, the derivative is 
negative, reflecting the disincentive effect of higher benefits on labour supply. 
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Summary 
In this paper we study the effects of unemployment insurance on the labour market. We use the static 
neo-classical labour market model and the search model to come to a number of hypotheses about 
these effects. Next, we review the empirical results on the effect of unemployment insurance on the 
level and duration of unemployment. Most important conclusion is that higher unemployment benefits 
have a significant but small effect on the duration of unemployment. Regarding the modelling of 
unemployment insurance, we derived an 'effective' labour supply equation, including unemployment 
benefits and contributions, from utility maximization. We also found that information on the properties 
of real-world benefit systems is necessary for the correct modelling of unemployment insurance. 
Furthermore, this study shows that the effects of unemployment insurance are dependent on the 
labour market regime: in the case of a clearing labour market, higher unemployment benefits will 
raise unemployment while unemployment does not change when the labour market is demand-
constrained. 
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